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Examining The End of Revolution: A Foretaste of Wang Hui’s Thought   
Abstract  Wang Hui is a significant contemporary Chinese thinker and a key 
representative of Chinese New Left thought. This essay provides a critical review of 
some of the themes that emerge from Wang’s The End of Revolution as a means of 
situating his position in China’s intellectual landscape, with a particular mind to 
exploring the historicity of Wang’s thought as it informs his views. The essay engages 
some of the key discursive threads in The End of Revolution and provides a critical 
overview of Wang’s positions on neoliberalism, the tension between Western 
articulations of modernity and China’s own self-image. 
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REFEREED REVIEW ESSAY 
Examining The End of Revolution: A Foretaste of Wang Hui’s Thought   
Introduction 
For much of the past decade, Professor Wang Hui (b. 1959), a literary scholar at 
Tsinghua University, has been one of the most robust and eloquent critics of the 
direction, contours and consequences of China’s economic reforms. An expert on the 
work of Lu Xun (1881-1936), Wang was awarded a PhD in literature at Nanjing 
University in 1988 and soon thereafter participated in the Democracy Spring 
movement that culminated in the Tiananmen Square repression. Wang was 
subsequently sent to Shaanxi for ‘re-education’, where the plight of China’s 
disenfranchised peasants and migrant labourers, and the manifest inequalities caused 
by the beginnings of the marketization of state and society became a central influence 
on his intellectual work. A prolific writer, renowned public speaker and one of the 
pre-eminent opponents of neoliberalism in post-reform China, Wang was recognized 
by the American Foreign Policy magazine in 2008 as one of the world’s one hundred 
most influential thinkers.  
Despite this extraordinary trajectory, comparatively little of Wang’s work has 
been translated into English to date. The publication of The End of Revolution, a 
compilation that provides a taste of the complexity and some of the major themes in 
his, as yet untranslated, four-volume The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought (2004 
[2008]), represents an opportunity for non-Chinese readers to engage with Wang’s 
ideas on modernity, nationhood and democracy and, his powerful denouement of 
neoliberalism in the Chinese context. Superbly edited by Rebecca Karl, The End of 
Revolution provides a selection of key articles and interviews published between 1994 
and 2007, reflecting on the period from the Democracy Spring to the consolidation of 
market dominance in China (and neoliberal globalization of which Wang is a 
prominent critic). In this essay, we use a critical review of some of the themes that 
emerge from The End of Revolution as a means of situating Wang’s position in 
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China’s intellectual landscape, with a particular mind to exploring the historicity of 
Wang’s thought as it informs his New Left views.1  
In the following sections, we offer a review of some of the key discursive threads in 
The End of Revolution that we deem of particular significance to students of modern 
Chinese history. Yet, we also concede right at the outset that such a review -- based as 
it is on essays in translation -- cannot cover the entire breadth of Wang’s complex 
thought as manifest in his Chinese-language work. Instead, we foretaste here Wang’s 
thought on neoliberalism and on the tension between Western articulations of 
modernity and China’s own self-image in pre-modern times as progressive 
cosmopolitan Empire.  
The New Left and the Critique of Neoliberalism  
Until the emergence of the New Left movement in the 1990s, the reform era 
intellectual landscape was dominated by a narrative in which ‘traditional’ China was 
obliged to catch up with the ‘modern’ West. Progress towards this conception of 
modernity meant distancing from non-Western traditions embodied in the 
authoritarian continuities of feudalism and Maoism. Liberal intellectuals envisaged a 
process in which the market would foster the liberation of society from the state. In 
basic terms, most ‘liberals’ and ‘neoliberals’ see the pre-modern Chinese state, 
embodied in the imperial bureaucracy, as predatory and all-pervasive, and suggest 
that these qualities atavistically configured Chinese modernity as a whole. In that 
sense, there are similarities between Chinese ‘liberal’ and ‘neo-liberal’ views and 
those of Karl Wittfogel (1957), who at the height of the Cold War, castigated the 
Chinese pre-modern polity as one of ‘Oriental despotism’.  
Chinese ‘liberals’ are usually more statist in orientation than ‘neo-liberal’ intellectuals, 
but both schools are clearly distinct from New Left figures like Wang, Beijing 
University sociologist Pan Wei, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Yu 
Yongding and others in their perception of state-embeddedness in Chinese early-
                                                          
1
 For discussion of the genesis of the term ‘New Left’ in the Chinese context, see Carter (2010). The 
focus of this essay is on Wang Hui and the broader New Left, the contours of which we discuss below. 
We do not deal with Neo-Maoism, which represents a discrete position embodied by former Chongqing 
Party Secretary, Bo Xilai.  
4 
 
modern history.
2
 Contrary to Wittfogel’s conventional wisdom, Wang views the 
Chinese pre-modern and early-modern polity as one where state-embeddedness was 
tenuous. Of course, there is an acknowledgement that Mao Zedong changed the 
pattern of governance in the 1950s, ensconcing state power deep into even the 
remotest parts of the countryside. Yet, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms of the 1980s have 
been criticized precisely because they rolled back the state, leaving under-developed 
parts of the country to fend for themselves. As some New Left critics see it, the 
removal of the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ (tie fanwan), i.e., life-time job security with 
complementary housing and healthcare, has reduced the quality of life in China 
leaving the most vulnerable constituents of society trodden upon. Furthermore, in the 
face of economic growth, they argue that inequality, displacement, pollution, 
consumerism and political apathy have been tolerated by the central authorities to an 
excessive extent. A loose and diverse intellectual congregation, thinkers of the 
Chinese New Left generally operate from within the CCP establishment, and do not 
openly challenge the Party. Many New Left figures accept market reforms, but 
maintain that Chinese development should be more balanced, equitable, less growth 
oriented and more sustainable (Vukovich 2012).   
As an editor of the highly regarded journal Dushu from 1996 until his ouster in 
2007, Wang established his position as a central figure in China’s broad New Left. 
Although liberalism in its multiple variations has – in the face of Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) antipathy – retained centre-stage in the intellectual landscape, New Left 
views have enjoyed relative freedom of expression in the past decade, as intellectuals 
grapple with both the consequences of three decades of reform and the possibility of 
American decline. In well-known essays on the ‘depoliticization of politics’ and the 
1989 student movement, versions of which are reproduced in The End of Revolution, 
and in the Chinese publication of The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought, Wang 
established his critique of the notion of history as the teleological process it appears in 
the liberal narrative and disputed the Western model as the sole source of modernity, 
marginalizing as it does alternative sources particular to China.  
                                                          
2
 Liberals are also less critical of US foreign policy, and would rarely describe the Kosovo war as 
‘imperialistic’, as Wang does in The End of Revolution (p. 63). Prominent pro-Western Chinese liberal 
thinkers include, among others, Nobel prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, film-maker Su Xiaokang, economist 
Mao Yushi, jurist He Wefang, historians Qin Hui and Xu Jilin, dissidents Li Zehou, Wang Juntao and 
Chen Ziming. Prominent Chinese ‘neo-lebrals’ include, among others, economists Zhang Weiying and 
Chen Zhiwu.   
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One of the key points of divergence between Wang and the liberal intellectual 
position as critiqued in The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought, echoes historian 
Alexander Day’s formulation, namely, that the liberal ‘enlightenment’ narrative 
‘conceal[s] the repressive link between market reforms and the postrevolutionary 
state’, a veil which intellectuals should work to tear down (2011: 142). Wang is 
persuasive is in his critique of the CCP, and the way it unabashedly embraced big 
business under Jiang Zemin. As a result, Wang perceives increasingly scant difference 
between the CCP and political parties in Western democracies, where in his rendition 
political institutions have become an instrument for the imposition of the market on 
society (pp. 6-8).  
Wang’s concern for the party’s declining claim to representativeness identifies 
‘market conditions’ as the culprit, and argues that ‘the interests and needs of the lower 
strata find no expression within the political sphere’ (pp. xxix-xxxi). This dislocation 
is one consequence of what Wang sees as the pernicious ‘de-theorisation’ of the 
ideological sphere (p. 7). Wang’s lament for the declining ‘politicization of politics’ is 
extracted from the separation of economics and politics characteristic of neoliberal 
globalization. When the former leads the latter, special market-driven interests 
develop ominous leverage over political institutions (including the CCP), which in 
turn effect the ‘disconnection of democracy as a political structure from the basic 
units of society’ (p. xxx).  
Rationalism, Modernity and the Nation 
One of the recurrent preoccupations in Wang’s oeuvre is modernity and its 
relationship with the nation. Unlike the holistic, teleological conception of modernity 
of the Hegelian school, Wang sees modernity as ‘paradoxical [and] containing 
intrinsic tensions and contradictions’ (p. 75). He thus rejects the notion that 
‘modernity’ can simply be transposed from one context (the West) to another (China). 
These tensions and contradictions are aptly summed up in the description of Chinese 
modernity as ‘anti-modern modernity’, by which Wang means that anti-traditional 
views were accompanied by anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist positions. Contrary to 
liberals who view this contradiction as self-defeating, Wang argues that it is ‘the 
source of modernity’s self-renewal’ (p. 79). In practice, Chinese modernity was born 
out of the struggle against Western colonial domination, but when the colonial yoke 
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was removed, worship of Western rationalism became even more entrenched among 
Chinese political and intellectual elites.
3Although Wang’s critique of the residual 
worship of Western rationalism in China and the Hegelian bias it speaks to are highly 
pertinent to envisioning China’s future, the roots of that worship can be traced back to 
the May Fourth Movement of 1919. A substantial body of literature has built up 
concerning rationalism in this period, which Wang does not fully engage with.
4
  
In critiquing the ‘over-rationalist’ spirit of the May Fourth Movement, Wang 
seems to be charting other historic paths to modernity or, in other words, socially 
mellower alternatives to nation-statehood in its early-modern Western iteration. Yet, 
the alternative on offer is ambiguous and redolent of existing ideas. For instance, his 
critique of Western nation-statehood as repressively thrust (or self-inflicted) upon 
Asia is reminiscent of Duara (1996). Duara’s treatment was itself an impressively 
detailed riposte to Joseph Levenson’s influential work in the field of Chinese history 
(1958 [2005]). Levenson portrayed proponents of tradition in early twentieth century 
China like Liang Qichao or Zhang Binglin as unself-conscious compared with the 
pro-Western modernisers of the May Fourth Movement. Duara drew parallels 
between Liang, Zhang and the conscious, if tentative, pan-Asianism of Tagore and 
Gandhi in charting what might have been a softer Asian alternative to organising the 
late-colonial world. He also underscored Marxism and Shi’ite fundamentalism as 
challenges to the modern nation-state bailiwick, and discussed at length the sub-ethnic 
and class strains than inherently subverted the cohesion of the nation state.   
Following Duara and some more recent work by Chinese foreign-policy 
theoreticians like for example Zhao Tingyang (2005), Wang seems to point to 
possibilities where the Chinese civilizational trope Tianxia (‘All under Heaven’) 
could be resurrected to relax the particularistic straitjacket of the Westphalian world 
order (Carlson 2011). Notably, Lucian Pye observed that China was unique in being a 
civilization pretending to be a nation state (1992: 235), and Chinese exceptionality 
has been invoked along much the same lines by Martin Jacques (2009), Zhang 
Weiwei (2012) and other proponents of a ‘China Model’. These analysts share the 
conviction that China’s path to super-power status will differ from the one traversed 
                                                          
3
 Wang consistently criticizes this tendency, but neglects how Maoist ideology precipitated a backlash 
against the oppressive rationalism of Soviet-style Marxism. Neither does the Lu Xun expert discuss the 
great author’s role in advancing the ‘worship’ of rationalism in China 
4
 For a useful overview of this literature see Mitter (2004) chapters 1-4. 
 
7 
 
by European powers and the US. Because pre-modern China was a civilizational 
rather than an all-pervasive polity, Wang, Zhang and Jacques each imply that China 
will not behave imperialistically on the world stage, settling instead for symbolic (i.e. 
tributary) recognition of its new leading status.  
As yet, however, China appears to be sticking with Wesphalian protocol as 
ardently as its counterparts in the West. Consider for example, the pomp and 
accolades enjoyed by leaders from even the smallest and poorest countries during 
their visits to Beijing, a treatment that betokens an insistence on treating sovereign 
states as equal, quite in contrast to the pre-modern hierarchical Tianxia framework.   
Another criticism of Pye’s civilizational argument, which Wang seems to 
readily embrace, is that it understates Mao’s achievement in unifying the country, 
spreading Mandarin as the official language, increasing literacy rates and coalescing 
national identity through a partly imagined narrative of a New China (Xinhua). It is 
surprising that Wang should brush over Mao’s extraordinary nation-building project 
without explicitly discussing the nature of what went on during the period, and 
specifying how a softer civilizational framework could have replaced the well-trodden 
Western pathway to modern nationhood. While Wang’s reflections on the Mao era 
sometimes tend toward the sentimental (see for instance p. 48, pp. 58-60), they are 
partly based on credible foundations, with the exception of the glowing portrayal of 
the early 1950s prior to the Great Leap Forward. In focusing on the ‘strong sense of 
political consciousness’ and ‘enthusiastic spirit of initiative’ generated by land 
reforms and structural adjustments in the countryside (p. xxi), Wang seems to neglect 
research on how painful and destructive to social cohesion land collectivisation 
proved to be.
5
  
Neoliberal narratives of China’s pre-war economy imply that Mao’s land 
reforms were redundant. Wang rightly rejects these claims but his rendition of Mao’s 
land reforms fails to acknowledge that most farmers were at the time freeholders and 
that the distribution of land had already been more equitable in North China. There 
are even claims, admittedly controversial, that Mao prevented peasants from moving 
into bigger cities in order to subsidize heavy industry and the atomic-bomb project 
                                                          
5
 See, for instance, Zhang (2009).  
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(Dikötter 2013). In that sense, the peasants who brought the CCP to power were 
ultimately strongly disadvantaged vis-à-vis city dwellers, and as Wang acknowledges, 
it was only in 1978 that the rural-urban gap began to close somewhat (pp. 23-24, p. 
26).  
A further contradiction arises in the sense that the vague civilizational 
alternative to the nation-state straitjacket Wang advocates, itself appears to be an 
antidote to the politicised society characteristic of the Mao era which Wang often 
seems to pine for. Wang’s rather enigmatic summation is that ‘all universalisms are 
actually part of particular phenomenon, rather than simply existing within the 
dichotomy of particular universalisms’ (p. 116). He then adds that the question of 
whether China is a nation-state or an Empire is unanswerable (p.132). 
In Matters of History, History Matters 
Wang’s self-described ‘difficult’ prose is not as significant an obstacle to 
understanding his thought as the historical grounding of his arguments. To put it 
tactfully, Wang is not preoccupied with footnotes, chronology, argumentative 
sequence and the other formalisms common to academic writing. The construction of 
his essay on ‘Modern Chinese Thought’ (p. 105) is symptomatic. Following a long 
and highly abstract introduction, readers are promised a ‘concrete’ discussion of 
empire and nation-state, which does not go beyond generalities.  
Drawing on André Frank’s controversial work (1998), Wang casually 
speculates that ‘without links to the East, the Industrial Revolution probably could not 
have occurred’ (p. xxxx). If such transformative ‘links’ did indeed exist, one would 
expect them to be concisely spelled out and grounded in referenced sources. Wang 
similarly invokes Frank in his discussion of pre-modern Chinese economic history. 
He describes ‘the use of silver and copper currency in the competing polities of the 
Five Dynasties era [CE 907-979]’ as an indicator that ‘foreign trade was beginning to 
occur’ (p. 28). However, economic historians might actually balk at the suggestion 
that the currency at the time of the Five Dynasties was mostly silver-based, or date the 
take-off of foreign trade to that moment.
6
  
                                                          
6
 For a discussion of the monetary setting in the Five Dynasties era in the larger scheme of Chinese 
history, see for example Elvin (1973). 
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Another historical lacuna emerges in Wang’s discussion of ‘the first generation of 
Chinese who sought constitutional democracy [that] arose in the 1920s’ (p. 103). It is 
not clear why someone as well versed in early twentieth Century Chinese history as 
Wang would omit mention of China’s earlier experiment with democratically-elected 
provincial assemblies as of 1905 (Elvin 1996). Yet, even in the 1920s, Chinese 
liberals were more ‘statist’ in their outlook than their Western counterparts, as 
Edmund Fung (2010) has shown.
 
Fung also shows how even during the iconoclastic 
1920s, a few leading Chinese intellectuals still wished to restore the tenets of 
Confucian statecraft, and how these intellectuals presaged, in a sense, the 
contemporary semi-official Confucian revival in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).   
Wang’s insistence on the historicity of Chinese meritocracy is consistent with 
proponents of the ‘China Model’ and ‘New Confucianism’ across numerous 
disciplines, who highlight the remarkable longevity and uniqueness of China’s 
imperial system. Here too though, there are questions of historical accuracy and 
grounding. Wang writes that ‘in fact, there are now many studies showing that 
England’s civil service system was inspired to a degree by China’s civil service 
tradition’ (p. 135). Typically none of these ‘many studies’ is cited, and a closer 
historical analysis shows that the empirical basis for this argument is tenuous. Albeit 
uncited by Wang, we hasten to add that an authoritative study claiming Chinese 
inspiration for British civil-service meritocracy does exist. Yet, it was penned by Teng 
Ssu-yu (1943), and was based on circumstantial rather than archival sources. 
In fact, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the British civil service (1853) led 
to the replacement of political patronage in favour of life-long appointment of 
apolitical mandarins with broad liberal educations, and advanced the notion that 
recruitment of British civil servants should be based on a generalist examination 
system (Chapman and Greenaway 1980). To our knowledge there are no studies 
based on in-house archival material that show Northcote and Trevelyan in actual fact 
specifically modelled their proposed examinations on China’s generalist (i.e. 
Confucian) imperial examinations,
7
 although the op-ed pages of the London Times 
that year contain sarcastic attacks on Northcote and Trevelyan for introducing 
                                                          
7
 It is more likely they were inspired by the Prussian and French bureaucratic reforms at the time. See 
for instance, Greenaway (2004). 
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backward ‘Chinese’ ideas into Britain.8 That aside, Wang’s celebration of Chinese 
meritocracy runs contrary to one of the most authoritative archive-based studies of 
China’s imperial examination system, by Benjamin A. Elman (2000), which casts 
doubt on the extent to which the pre-modern examination system could be seen as 
meritocratic.  
In other places too, historical events are sacrificed for theorizing. Dissecting 
the Global Financial Crisis that began in 2008, Wang argues that ‘[it] has shown that 
crises arise precisely from shifts in the autonomies of societies’ and that such crises 
are resistant to the reassertion of the ‘old ideals of sovereignty’ (p. xxvii). While 
Wang’s critique of market dominance is effective, it is necessary to point out that 
China was able to withstand the Global Financial Crisis better than the West precisely 
because it did re-assert ‘the old ideals of sovereignty’ by insisting on a managed 
currency and an insular banking system, which protected its economy from major 
damage. Wang could be easily mistaken here for describing the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, where Southeast Asian economies were badly hit rather than China. Southeast 
Asia teetered on the brink of collapse due in part to the flight of hot money overseas, 
and following the opening up of their financial systems in line with advice from 
Washington. In 1997, China emerged relatively unscathed precisely because the CCP 
refused to surrender to neo-liberal conventional wisdom.  
Conclusion 
Wang Hui is a significant contemporary Chinese thinker and, as a key representative 
of New Left thought, deserves to be studied more widely by Western observers 
interested in understanding the intellectual and political landscape of the PRC. The 
publication of The End of Revolution thus represents an important opportunity for 
non-Chinese readers to engage with Wang’s work through a compilation of shorter 
articles that are emblematic of his wider oeuvre. The End of Revolution reveals the 
foundations of a fascinating dissenting public intellectual, and one who is quite 
unique in his breadth of knowledge and familiarity with Western theory. Wang’s 
intimate understanding of the latest trends in Western humanities is formidable. 
Indeed, he appears equally at ease with post-colonial theoretical constructs like the 
                                                          
8
 See for instance an anonymous letter to the Times Editor published on page 9 on 17
th
 March 1854 
entitled ‘The Organization of the Civil Service’. 
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‘subaltern’ and pre-modern Confucian cosmological ideas such as the ‘heavenly 
principle’ (tianli). As much as it concerns contemporary China, The End of Revolution 
is replete with references to prominent European New Left theoreticians such as Louis 
Althusser (p. 14), Antonio Gramsci (p. 15) and Michel Foucault (p. 70, 165), although 
Wang diverges from these generally Eurocentric thinkers in his insistence on Chinese 
historic distinctness.  
The great socio-economic structural adjustments that China has encountered in 
the past thirty years have created abundant contradictions and ambiguities, and it is 
perhaps not surprising that these are also evident in The End of Revolution. Wang is 
arguably the most ardent critic of the ‘neoliberal’ streak in Chinese intellectual 
debates. On the other hand, Wang is by no means alone in grappling with, for 
instance, the epistemological problem of accurately diagnosing what constitutes the 
‘Chinese model’ following the past three decades of economic reform. Wang’s 
historical interpretations and theoretical arguments are distinct and he is not afraid to 
go against conventional wisdom. His broad-stroke identification of the 1989 student 
movement in China with much later anti-globalization protests in the West, for 
instance, is very thought-provoking and highly original.  
In sum, Wang’s sharply expressed non-conformism is a valuable counterpoint 
to prevailing trends in the PRC intellectual scene. However, the historical accuracy, 
and interpretations of historical events underpinning The End of Revolution are, at 
times, questionable at times, and Wang’s light footnoting also detract from what is 
otherwise a very impressive intellectual accomplishment.  
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